



Religious Propaganda: Speech by Sjafruddin Prawiranegara During the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia

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Abstract

Objective: This study examines how propaganda in Sjafruddin Prawiranegara's speech through Radio YBJ-6 functioned as an effective political communication strategy of PDRI during the 1948 crisis, focusing on religious messaging, moral persuasion, and narrative framing to sustain resistance and governmental legitimacy. **Theoretical framework:** The analysis is based on political communication, propaganda, and framing theories that emphasize persuasive messaging, crisis communication, and symbolic legitimacy within emergency political contexts. **Literature review:** The review discusses Propaganda Theory, PDRI historical studies, religious messaging in nationalist movements, and radio broadcasting as a wartime communication medium. **Methods:** Using a qualitative literature-based approach and content analysis, data were collected from historical documents, PDRI archives, and prior research. Analysis followed Miles and Huberman's stages with a within-case method to identify thematic and persuasive elements. **Results:** The study finds that Sjafruddin's propaganda effectively mobilized the military and civilians through religious narratives, moral contrast with Dutch aggression, and calls for unity. Despite a limited communication infrastructure, Radio YBJ-6 successfully reached domestic and international audiences, sustaining morale and legitimacy. **Implication:** The research highlights the strategic use of religious-moral narratives and radio communication in maintaining state continuity and influencing public sentiment during crises. **Novelty:** This study proposes a religious-moral propaganda framing model that explains PDRI's hybrid use of spiritual rhetoric, nationalist appeal, and political legitimacy in a constrained communication environment.

Keywords: propaganda, religious, communications, sjafruddin prawiranegara's, pdri.

INTRODUCTION

Propaganda is believed to be an effective tool during wartime to mobilize the masses [1]. However, its effectiveness is highly dependent on the strength of the media used [2]. A distorted propaganda process throughout its distribution can actually diminish its effectiveness [3]. To this day, various forms of propaganda appear in the mass media [4]. The content relates to various war situations [5].

Then, under certain circumstances, an event occurred that was highly susceptible to distortion in the spread of propaganda. This incident occurred during the early years of the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PDRI) in 1948. This occurred because there was only one radio station available to disseminate the propaganda. However, in reality, this propaganda succeeded in igniting the Indonesian people's fighting spirit, despite the potential for distortion in its spread [6].

The incident began on December 19, 1948. The Dutch launched a military aggression against Yogyakarta, which was then the capital of the Republic of Indonesia, causing the government to be paralyzed. Soekarno-Hatta was arrested, and communication equipment was controlled by the Dutch, so that the world thought that Indonesia's sovereignty had been lost, especially since Indonesia was not yet a member of the UN [7]. In this critical situation, the nation's founders considered it necessary to temporarily transfer the reins of government, and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara was appointed to lead the emergency government. He and his entourage moved to Bukittinggi and Halaban to escape Dutch pursuit, while starting a guerrilla war [8]. Despite disrupted communications and a chaotic situation, Indonesia continued to strive to maintain sovereignty by forming the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PDRI) led by Sjafruddin, accompanied by strategic steps to form a cabinet and tactical efforts to improve the communication network [9].

Until Indonesia arrived on December 22, 1948. The radio transmitter, the only means of mass communication, was saved. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara delivered a speech over the radio. This was the beginning of Indonesia's declaration of war through propaganda. Sjafruddin delivered straightforward and proactive language. The following is Sjafruddin's full speech on Radio YBJ-6:

The Dutch attacked on Sunday, a day usually used by Christians to worship God. They attacked at a time when the Christmas Day of Isa AS would soon be celebrated, a holy and peaceful day for Christians. Precisely because of all this, especially the actions of the Dutch who admitted that they were Christians, showed more clearly and clearly the nature and character of the Dutch people: cunning, deceitful, and cruel.

Due to this surprise attack, they managed to capture the President, Vice President, Prime Minister, and several other dignitaries. Thus, they assumed the Republic of Indonesia was facing a situation comparable to that faced by the Netherlands during the German occupation during World War II, when its people were at a loss, its leaders were in despair, and its country was beyond help.

But we proved that the Dutch calculations were completely wrong. The Dutch thought that with the capture of our top leaders, other leaders would despair. The Republic of Indonesia does not depend on Sukarno and Hatta, even though both leaders are invaluable to us. Brokenness grows, lostness is replaced!

To all the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, we call: Fight, attack the Dutch wherever and however you can, and eradicate them. Do not lay down your arms or cease fire unless ordered to do so by the government we lead. Keep this in mind to avoid enemy deception!

In addition to straightforward and proactive language, Sjafruddin's speech certainly contained elements of propaganda, rife with propaganda techniques. One example is the use of oversimplification, noted by Liliweri as a form of simplifying a message by downplaying a highly complex event. This technique aims to provide a sense of security to the audience. This technique is clearly visible in the third paragraph of Sjafruddin's speech [10].

Sjafrudin also explicitly stated that the enemies of the Republic of Indonesia were not only Dutch but also identified as Christians. This was propaganda that incorporated religious elements. This is the basis for the importance of studying religious propaganda to gain a deeper understanding of propaganda events during the PDRI era [11].

Propaganda has often been used to strengthen religious beliefs, even as early as the first century by the apostle Paul in his Christian faith [12]. However, social change also often occurs through religious values [13]. In the context of the PDRI, the religious values conveyed by Sjafruddin successfully rallied the people to defend Indonesian independence.

Sjafruddin bluntly stated that the Dutch miscalculations had been misplaced. He also asserted that the Republic of Indonesia would not be destroyed simply by capturing its leaders. The Indonesian public at the time needed to be informed that the Indonesian government was in a state of emergency. Meanwhile, Sjafruddin conveyed to the public the impression that the Republic of Indonesia would be fine [14].

The fact that the Republic of Indonesia was in good condition when led by the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia is controversial. Gusti Asnan, in an interview with Kompas TV, believed that the Second Dutch Military Aggression could have resulted in the worst possible outcome for the Republic when Sjafruddin's entourage was unable to save Radio YBJ-6, which was then used as a transmitter for Sjafruddin's speech. This meant that Indonesia was not in good condition, and Sjafruddin implied in his speech that Indonesia was in good condition. This proves that propaganda was indeed present during the PDRI [15].

In another context, the Netherlands re-declared the Dutch East Indies after the military aggression. This effort was known as recolonization. The world viewed Indonesia at that time with considerable concern. Some countries, such as the Netherlands, considered that Indonesia had returned to being the Dutch East Indies [16]. India and Egypt, on the other hand, considered the transfer of power to Sjafruddin Prawiranegara an effort to maintain Indonesian independence [17]. Meanwhile, the United States chose to remain neutral during this incident [18]. This situation gave rise to the assumption that the propaganda carried out by the PDRI was not only aimed at the Indonesian people but also important to be directed at the global community.

Propaganda can be viewed from various sides [19]. One of them is the time span for delivering propaganda [20]. Liliweri also noted a technique called stalling, a technique used to stall for time to diminish previous propaganda or propaganda launched by the enemy [21]. This technique was also used during the PDRI (Indonesian Democratic Republic of Indonesia). At that time, the YBJ-6 radio could actually be used on December 21, 1948, but the PDRI gave Sjafruddin a timeframe to deliver his speech on Indonesian sovereignty when the Dutch were no longer broadcasting their propaganda about the destruction of Indonesian sovereignty.

Furthermore, propaganda can be simply reviewed from its content, media base, timeframe, modeling, composition techniques, and so on. Likewise, propaganda throughout the PDRI can also be reviewed further. However, the main focus of this manuscript lies in the propaganda in Sjafrudin Prawiranegara's speech during the transition of power to the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia. The following problem is formulated: how was Religious Propaganda during the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia?

LITERATURE REVIEW

Propaganda is a deliberate and systematic effort to influence public opinion, attitudes, or behavior to achieve certain goals, often related to political, ideological, or social interests [22]. In conveying messages, propaganda often uses strong emotional elements, such as fear, hope, or anger, to arouse audiences [23], and utilizes stereotypes and stigmatization of certain groups to shape public opinion [24]. Selective selection of information, the use of authoritative figures, and strong symbols or slogans are also important strategies in building effective propaganda messages [25].

Propaganda does not stand alone, but rather starts from certain ideas and concepts which are then designed by a propagandist through existing media, and is carried out systematically

so that its impact can be seen continuously [26]. Alfred McLung Lee and Elizabeth Briant Lee (1939) in *The Fine Art of Propaganda* put forward seven classic propaganda techniques, namely Name Calling, Glittering Generality, Transfer, Testimonial, Plain Folks, Card Stacking, and Bandwagon [27]. Over time, various studies have simplified these techniques into more applicable terms, such as labeling, stereotyping, emotional techniques, information selection, and message repetition [28], [29].

Other frequently encountered techniques include condemning political opponents and using prominent figures or celebrities to support the message, as well as reinforcement through easily recognizable slogans and symbols [30]. These approaches demonstrate that propaganda is a complex and carefully designed communication practice, not just a simple message. In the context of studying religious propaganda during the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PDRI), understanding these techniques is crucial for analyzing the message, its purpose, and its impact within the historical and socio-political context of the time.

METHODOLOGY

This article was written using a literature study approach with content analysis. The object of this research is propaganda that occurred during the transfer of power from the Republic of Indonesia to the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia. The data were analyzed qualitatively. The data analysis technique was carried out in stages, starting from data reduction, data presentation, and drawing conclusions based on the technique within in case; Exploring and describing by Miles and Huberman. Therefore, the results and discussion in this study contain cases or events that will be described and explored further with various related references.

Table 1. Research Method Used in This Study

Aspect	Description
Type of Research	Literature study (library research)
Approach	Qualitative approach with content analysis
Research Objective	To examine propaganda during the transfer of power from the Republic of Indonesia to the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PDRI)
Rationale for Approach	A qualitative literature approach allows deep exploration of historical events, narratives, and propaganda messages through documented sources
Key Figures Analyzed	Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and other PDRI communication actors involved in propaganda dissemination
Main Data Sources	Historical documents, archives of PDRI communication, scholarly studies, books, and relevant previous research
Method of Analysis	Miles and Huberman model: data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing using within-case analysis
Theoretical Framework	Political communication theory, propaganda theory, and framing analysis
Focus of Analysis	Structure, content, and persuasive elements of propaganda used during the power transition to PDRI
Expected Outcome	A comprehensive description of propaganda strategies, their functions in maintaining legitimacy, and their role in shaping public perception during the 1948 emergency period

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Generalization of Issues and Propaganda Ideas

The Indonesian government swiftly transferred power to Sjafrudin Prawiranegara through a memo from President Sukarno. This transfer of power was seen as a manifestation of Sukarno's presidential responsibilities. However, the full responsibility for independence rested with Sjafrudin and the guerrillas who accompanied him [31].

This responsibility to defend independence later became the initial idea and concept for propaganda. This is evidenced by the alternative measures chosen by Sjafrudin and other guerrillas. At that time, Sjafrudin's group took the initiative to disseminate information regarding Indonesia's independence status [32]. They chose to use radio channels, which were then recorded using YBJ 6 radio, which was in Tanah Datar at the time. Conceptually, this similar reality can be seen as a propaganda effort. Ideas and media are crucial elements in conducting propaganda to garner support from various parties [33].

Sjafrudin wrote his own speech. He explicitly began his speech with hateful narratives that portrayed the Dutch as cunning, deceitful, and cruel. This narrative contradicted Sjafrudin's earlier assertion that the Christian Dutch should not disrupt the peace during Christmas celebrations. Historically, this narrative deeply disgusted the Dutch. Sjafrudin's ability to create these contradictions was a manifestation of the propaganda technique known as "Cardstacking" [34].

Furthermore, Sjafrudin provided information highly relevant to the nation's situation at the time. Sjafrudin stated that the Dutch success in capturing Indonesian leaders would not have the same effect as what happened to Germany during World War II. This choice of a similar narrative indicates that Sjafrudin was quite diligent in constructing a propaganda narrative, taking into account the right timing [35]. This was understandable, given that at the time, the Indonesian nation was still feeling the effects of the end of World War II. In fact, Indonesia's independence was achieved after Japan's surrender, marking the end of World War II.

Finally, Sjafrudin called on the Indonesian armed forces to fight and revolt against the Dutch forces. This call was clearly recorded as a form of war propaganda, as recorded by Ellul (2021). However, upon closer examination, this similar narrative was a deliberate emotional technique used to mobilize civilian power [36]. This idea was significant because at the time, Sjafrudin's movement was a guerrilla movement. This indicated that the PDRI needed popular support to provide space and logistics for the guerrillas [37].

The propaganda issues and ideas developed by Sjafrudin and his colleagues were to galvanize the armed forces and the people. Sjafrudin intelligently employed a religious approach, revealing the contradictions between the Dutch people's character and their religious teachings. This also proved that Sjafrudin, considered a devout Muslim, did not want to equate the Indonesian people with the Dutch in terms of religious identity [38].

The Government of the Republic of Indonesia – PDRI and Sjafrudin Prawiranegara in reviewing the concept of Propagandists

Conceptually, Sjafrudin's speech cannot be considered propaganda when it was only delivered once. Meanwhile, Sjafrudin's speech on the transfer of power from the Government of the Republic of Indonesia to the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia was a series of events preceded by various events [39].

President Sukarno held a meeting with several government officials at the time, including Mohammad Hatta, Sutan Syahrir, and even Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono. The meeting initially discussed countermeasures against the then-leaders. Then, after realizing that an escort was impossible due to the increasingly massive Dutch siege, the government changed

the topic. The government then shifted its focus to discussing the continuation of the government and Indonesian independence [40].

The discussion at that time even focused on appointing Moh. Hatta as Sukarno's successor. This was later rejected by Moh. Hatta, then stating that Mr. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara was more appropriate to continue the reins of power. Moh. Hatta's statement, demonstrating Sjafruddin's character, was the beginning of propaganda for the Indonesian government at that time. This statement carried a technique that used authoritative figures and celebrities.

Those attending the meeting at the time affirmed Moh. Hatta's statement. A memo transferring power to Sjafrudin, who was then in Bukittinggi, was immediately sent. Meeting attendees were also asked to convey a chain message regarding this transfer of power.

Propaganda continued after the emergency meeting concluded. It is understood that the Indonesian government, under President Sukarno, acted as the propagandist. Their propaganda promoted the idea that Indonesian independence would continue even without President Sukarno's leadership. This propaganda also served as internal Indonesian propaganda to prevent the Dutch from becoming aware of the situation.

On December 19, 1948, after Sjafrudin received the memorandum of authority, he and his government also became propagandists. Their propaganda ideas were similar to those of the previous government. The difference was that Sjafruddin had a specific approach, emphasizing the values of a particular religion. This approach was cleverly expressed in a form of contradiction, demonstrating that the Dutch were not a people who adhered to their religion. This type of propaganda is referred to as religious propaganda.

Propaganda that promotes the concept of sustainability ultimately fails to polarize existing propagandists. Conceptually, propaganda is considered a sustainable effort. This is what makes it difficult to polarize the propagandist cluster between the Republic of Indonesia government and its Emergency Government. Based on this concept, this study found that the Republic of Indonesia government and the PDRI were propagandists who promoted the idea that Indonesia's independence was still intact despite being attacked by Dutch military aggression.

Propagandists are known to come from individuals or groups. It is also known that in propaganda, it is common to appoint a single propagandist to deliver the propaganda material. Based on these two concepts, the author assumes that Sjafruddin Prawiranegara was solely a propagandist. Although he wrote a speech to be delivered to the public, this does not necessarily mean he can be called a propagandist.

Sjafruddin's speech text was written entirely independently. However, propaganda doesn't emphasize the message. Instead, it focuses on the idea it wishes to convey. This is what led the author to assume that the true propagandist in this incident was the government, not Sjafruddin, the legitimate president at the time.

Furthermore, Sjafrudin can be identified as a propaganda actor. Unlike a propagandist, a propaganda actor is someone appointed to convey propaganda ideas to the target audience. Meanwhile, a propagandist is an entity that develops propaganda ideas and strategies, including selecting propaganda actors. Nevertheless, Sjafrudin is a good propaganda actor. He can easily translate propaganda ideas into material. He can also do this using an approach that is easily understood by the Indonesian people.

Table 2. Framework: RI Government – PDRI and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara in the Concept of Propagandists

Aspect	Description
Main Context	Transfer of authority from the RI Government to PDRI during Dutch Military Aggression II (1948).
Early Propaganda Formation	Hatta's endorsement of Sjafruddin as successor using

	authoritative-figure persuasion.
RI Government as Propagandist	Created and controlled propaganda ideas to ensure the continuity of independence and conceal the transition from the Dutch.
PDRI as Propagandist	Continued similar propaganda after receiving authority; added strong religious–moral framing.
Sjafruddin’s Position	Not the propagandist but the <i>propaganda actor</i> delivering messages crafted by the government.
Reasoning	Propaganda emphasizes strategic ideas, not the individual delivering the speech; thus, the government is the propagandist.
Key Finding	Both the RI Government and PDRI acted as propagandists, while Sjafruddin skillfully served as the appointed propaganda actor.

Polarization of the People and the Army in the context of propaganda

The propaganda carried out by the government at that time severely polarized the people and the military. This had been going on since the emergency government meeting on December 19, 1948. At that meeting, the discussion was separate, focusing on efforts to counter the leadership, which were actually related to the armed forces. Only after these efforts were deemed infeasible did the government discuss matters related to Indonesian independence, which was also closely related to the Indonesian nation. The people and the military seemed polarized.

In an interview with Metro TV, Gusti Asnan assessed that this polarization aimed to create boundaries between the people and the armed forces. Furthermore, the lack of boundaries between the people and the armed forces would only complicate the situation. The government at the time was concerned about Dutch aggression, which could potentially also target civilians.

This polarization demonstrates that the government's propaganda targets were indeed divided into two groups. The first was the Indonesian people and nation, while the second was the armed forces. This fact also confirms Liliweri's assertion that propaganda targets can be individuals, groups, or even something broader.

The polarization between the people and the military as the targets of propaganda continued, even to Sjafruddin's speech on Radio YBJ 6. The material in Sjafruddin's speech clearly demonstrated that this polarization was indeed real. This is evident in the final paragraph of the speech, which explicitly states, "To all the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, we call upon:" However, on the other hand, the government did not mention or convey this call to its people.

In its report, Kompas TV also noted that the guerrilla movement consistently sought to garner public support and strength. The PDRI was constantly on the move, requiring the community to actively participate in protecting Sjafruddin and his comrades. The strategy was to contact residents for each move. This was achieved by utilizing local communities to spread information by word of mouth.

Uniquely, besides ensuring shelter, Sjafruddin also ensured a place for his prayers. Thus, the messages conveyed to the public automatically included a sense of religiosity. Sjafruddin's religious attitudes and/or religious messages found a place in the hearts of the Indonesian people. Within the concept of continuity in propaganda, these similar messages also constitute a series of propaganda campaigns carried out by the government. This type of propaganda employs the technique of glittering generalities, where noble values are consistently emphasized.

Polarization became increasingly apparent during this incident. The PDRI's propaganda approaches and techniques were clearly distinct between the people and the armed forces. The propaganda approach directed toward the people appeared more religious, while the propaganda approach directed toward the armed forces was slightly more proactive and instructive. However, Sjafrudin cleverly combined the two approaches. This further infuriated the Dutch, as they were unsure who would accept and assist Sjafruddin in his guerrilla campaign.

Table 3. Framework: Polarization of People and the Army in Propaganda

Aspect	Description
Context	Government and PDRI propaganda during Dutch aggression created separation between civilians and armed forces.
Reason for Polarization	To protect civilians and maintain strategic clarity (Gusti Asnan).
Target Groups	Two propaganda targets: civilians and military.
Evidence	Sjafruddin's YBJ-6 speech addressed the military specifically; civilians were not directly called.
Civilian Involvement	Civilians supported PDRI guerrilla movements through shelter and information networks.
Messaging Style	Civilian propaganda: religious and emotional; military propaganda: directive and mobilizing.
Combined Approach	Sjafruddin blended both styles, increasing Dutch uncertainty.
Outcome	Polarization enabled targeted propaganda while sustaining collective resistance.

PDRI propaganda techniques

The propaganda techniques used by the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia were very diverse. Further details can be found in the text of Sjafruddin Prawira Negara's speech, which is presented in paragraphs. Other forms of propaganda will be discussed later.

"The Dutch attacked on a Sunday, a day Christians usually use to worship God. They attacked at a time when they were about to celebrate the birth of Jesus Christ, a holy and peaceful day for Christians. Precisely because of all of this, and especially because the Dutch claimed to be Christians, the Dutch nation's character and nature were even more clearly and tangibly demonstrated: cunning, deceit, and cruelty." (first paragraph of Sjafruddin Prawira Negara's Speech)

The quote above shows Sjafruddin using the Card Stacking, Plain Folk, and Name Calling techniques. The Card Stacking technique is seen in the use of factual narratives related to the time of the attack carried out by the Dutch. In addition, other facts are also related to the values adhered to by Christianity, which is the religion of the Dutch people. Meanwhile, the Plain Folk technique is seen in the narrative when Sjafruddin shows the contradiction between the religion embraced by the Dutch people and what they are doing. The name-calling technique is also clearly seen at the end of the paragraph. Sjafruddin clearly states that the Dutch are a cunning, cheating, and cruel nation.

"Because of this sudden attack, they have succeeded in capturing the President, Vice President, Prime Minister, and several other dignitaries. Thus, they suspect that they are facing a situation in the Republic of Indonesia that can be compared to the Netherlands itself when its country was occupied by Germany in World War II, when its people lost their minds, its leaders were in despair, and their country could no longer be saved" (Second paragraph of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara's Speech).

The quote above uses the card stacking and stereotyping techniques. The card stacking technique is clearly visible when Germany is described as a defeated nation after its leader

was incapacitated. However, Indonesia, unlike Indonesia, will not surrender even if its leader is captured; this is what is known as the stereotyping technique. This is where stereotypes of a nation are put forward in launching propaganda.

"But we proved that the Dutch calculations were completely wrong. The Dutch thought that by capturing our top leaders, other leaders would despair. The Republic of Indonesia does not depend on Sukarno and Hatta, even though both leaders are very valuable to us. Broken grows, lost is replaced!" (Third paragraph of Sjafruddin Prawira Negara's speech)

The quote above uses the card stacking technique and stereotypes accompanied by slogans. The card stacking technique is clearly visible when Sjafruddin states that the Dutch calculations were completely incorrect. The stereotyping technique is clearly visible when Sjafruddin says that the Republic of Indonesia does not depend on Soekarno-Hatta, even though both leaders were very important. Where stereotypes of a nation are put forward in launching propaganda. Finally, there is the slogan "broken, growing, lost, replaced," which suggests there will be a new leader after the old leader was overthrown by the Dutch. Similar signals are also referred to as slogans.

To all the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, we call: Fight, attack the Dutch wherever and with whatever means possible. Do not lay down your arms or cease fire unless ordered to do so by the government we lead. Keep this in mind to avoid enemy deception! (Fourth paragraph of Sjafruddin Prawira Negara's speech).

The quote above appears to employ the technique of criticism and uses all forms of persuasion. The use of criticism is evident in Sjafruddin's call to exterminate the Dutch wherever they are. Meanwhile, the use of all forms of persuasion is evident in the sentence "keep this in mind to avoid the enemy's deception!" Using all forms of persuasion is known to rely not only on persuasion but also on instructions.

Media and Propaganda Reach Global Society

Propaganda is believed to be a concept directly tied to space and time. This also means it involves the use of media only at specific times. The medium used in this propaganda was Radio YBJ 6. This radio was initially unusable. However, thanks to two volunteers from the Tanah Datar area, the radio was repaired and can be used again. The effort to obtain these two radio technicians can also be classified as a propaganda series [41].

These two technicians received a mandate to repair the YBJ 6 radio from members of the community who were not members of Sjafruddin and his friends' guerrillas. This initiative marked the beginning of the propaganda media. The propaganda channel was networked. Some experts refer to this type of propaganda channel as a communication channel, where messages can only reach where there is a communication channel.

After the message reached the two radio technicians, the radio was repaired and broadcast. At the time, many areas in Indonesia were unable to receive radio signals. In fact, the first YBJ 6 radio signal receiver was in New Delhi, India. Sjafruddin's speech, broadcast on the radio, garnered sympathy from the Indian government at the time. The concept of propaganda states that propaganda works when sympathy is generated in the target of the propaganda.

From the events above, it is clear that the propaganda media used were direct and networked communication channels. Furthermore, the YBJ-6 radio transmitter was used to disseminate information regarding Indonesia's independence to the global community. This indicates that the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia was truly conducting propaganda to demonstrate to the world that Indonesia was still independent and would remain so forever.

CONCLUSION

The propaganda issues and ideas developed by Sjafruddin and his friends focused on strengthening the armed forces and the people. Sjafruddin intelligently employed a religious approach, revealing the contradictions between the Dutch national character and their religious teachings. The Indonesian government and the PDRI were propagandists. As a propagandist, Sjafruddin polarized the propaganda targets to reduce the potential for Dutch aggression, which he feared would impact civilians. The polarization between the Indonesian people and the armed forces was evident in Sjafruddin Prawiranegara's speech. As a result, the guerrilla campaign undertaken by Sjafruddin and his friends also polarized the people and the armed forces. The PDRI also used various propaganda techniques to garner support from the people and the armed forces. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara's speech during the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia contained various effective and layered propaganda techniques. In the first paragraph, he used card stacking, plain folk, and name-calling techniques by linking the Dutch attack on the Sunday before Christmas to show the contradiction between religious teachings and colonial actions, and labeled the Dutch as cunning and cruel. The second paragraph contains card stacking and stereotyping techniques through a comparison of the conditions of Indonesia and the Netherlands during German colonization, emphasizing that Indonesia would not surrender. The third paragraph also shows card stacking, stereotyping, and the use of slogans such as "broken, growing, lost, replaced" to emphasize the continuity of the Indonesian leadership. Meanwhile, in the fourth paragraph, the techniques of criticism and using all forms of persuasion are used firmly in the form of direct instructions to troops to fight the Dutch and avoid enemy deception (Jowett & O'Donnell, 2018). PDRI propaganda also reached a global audience thanks to Radio YBJ-6, its communication medium. Sjafruddin's speech, first received in New Delhi, successfully garnered sympathy from the Indian government, demonstrating the effectiveness of propaganda messages when they elicited a response from their target audience. This indicates that the PDRI consciously used propaganda through online communication channels to demonstrate to the world that Indonesia remained independent and sovereign.

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Author's Contributions

All authors jointly designed the study, analyzed historical sources, and interpreted Sjafruddin Prawiranegara's speeches within the context of the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia. The first author drafted the manuscript, while the second author critically revised and refined the academic arguments.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest regarding the research, authorship, or publication of this article. The study was conducted independently without financial, institutional, or personal relationships that could influence the interpretation of data or the presentation of findings.

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